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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-EVIDENTIARY STAN-
DARDS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
SUITS-Department of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131, 301
S.E.2d 78 (1983).
INTRODUCTION
The declared legislative policy of North Carolina in the area of
employment is ". . .to protect and safeguard the right and oppor-
tunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without
discrimination or abridgement on account of race, religion, color,
national origin, age, sex or handicap. . . ."I The policy extends to
state employees2 as well as employees in the private sector. State
employees may seek redress by appealing discriminatory treatment
to the State Personnel Commission,3 while employees in the pri-
vate sector may seek redress by appealing discriminatory treat-
ment to the North Carolina Human Relations Council' or by alleg-
ing a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 and seeking redress
in the courts."
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (1983).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-36 (1981).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-36 (1981). A state employee may also proceed under
a federal statute without exhausting his administrative remedies through the
State Personnel Commission. Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d
156, appeal dismissed 295 N.C. 471, 246 S.E.2d 12 (1978) (state courts have con-
current jurisdiction to entertain claims under the Civil Rights Act).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-391 (1983) enumerates the functions and duties of
the North Carolina Human Relations Council which include the promotion of
equality for all citizens and the encouragement of employment of qualified people
without regard to race. The Council has the authority to investigate alleged dis-
criminatory practices and attempt to effect an amicable resolution to the prac-
tices. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.3 (1983).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1964). If a state agency has been established to
investigate discriminatory practices, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission must allow the state agency sixty days to resolve the discriminatory prac-
tice. In North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.3 (1983) gives the Human Re-
lations Council the authority to receive charges of discrimination from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and conciliate charges of discrimination.
However, seeking relief from the Human Relations Council is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to bringing an action under Title VII because the Human Relations
Council is not a "state authority established or authorized to grant or seek relief
from. . .discriminatory practice." Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 467 F. Supp.
364, 365 (W.D.N.C. 1979).
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In Department of Correction v. Gibson,6 the North Carolina
Supreme Court established evidentiary standards and principles of
law to be followed in employment discrimination cases. The court
adopted the standards established by federal decisions under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The court then found that the
State Personnel Commission had improperly applied the federal
evidentiary standards by imposing a stringent burden of proof on
the Department of Correction and by improperly substituting its
judgment for the legitimate judgment of the Department of Cor-
rection.8 The court remanded the case to the State Personnel Com-
mission for a new hearing9 and clarified the proper evidentiary
standards to be applied under N.C.G.S. § 126-36. However, the
court failed to address the most crucial issue in an employment
discrimination case: how the employee proves discriminatory mo-
tive on the part of his employer? The only attempt to establish
means of proof was couched in conclusory terms as to what could
not be considered-namely the credibility of the employer's busi-
ness judgment-instead of a discussion of what could be consid-
ered. The court clarified the proper procedural framework to be
utilized in a discrimination suit but failed to elaborate on the types
of evidence that can be utilized to prove an employer's discrimina-
tory motivation.
This note will examine the burden of proof which must be
borne by the employee in employment discrimination cases
brought under N.C.G.S. § 126-36 and the limited future utility of
N.C.G.S. § 126-36.
THE CASE
Sandhills Youth Center is a minimum security prison for
youthful offenders.10 The facility is divided into two main areas-a
segregation area and a nonsegregation area.11 The nonsegregation
area is designed to expose the inmates to a degree of freedom
before they are released; the segregation area is more like a tradi-
tional prison.12 Since the opening of the facility in 1974, the major-
6. 308 N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).
7. Id. at 141, 301 S.E.2d at 85.
8. Id. at 146-47, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
9. Id. at 148, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
10. Id. at 133, 301 S.E.2d at 80.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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ity of escapes have been from the nonsegregation area. 13
Earl Gibson, a black male, was a Correctional Program Assis-
tant I (CPA I) at the Sandhills Youth Center.' 4 On the evening of
April 23, 1979, Gibson was working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift
in the segregation area.15 He was responsible for ensuring that the
inmates had no mental or health problems and for ensuring that
escapes were detected at the earliest possible time after their oc-
currence. These responsibilities were fulfilled by hourly checks
throughout a shift which involved seeing "living, breathing flesh"
within each cell. 6 When Gibson reported for duty on the night in
question a cell containing two inmates, Crumpler and Dunlap, was
in a state of disarray, but when Gibson asked the guard on duty
about the condition, he was told that nothing was wrong.17 During
his shift, Gibson failed to properly see "flesh" in the cell contain-
ing these two inmates. 8 Mr. Gibson also failed to investigate when
the two inmates did not respond to a call for breakfast.'9 The CPA
I who took over Gibson's shift the following morning discovered
that the two inmates had escaped through a heating duct in the
ceiling.2 0 After the escape, the construction of the ceiling around
the heating ducts in the segregation area was reinforced with metal
lattice work." At the time of the escape, the segregation area was
inadequate to deter escapes.22 .A statement obtained from one of
the inmates who had escaped indicated that the escape occurred
before Gibson reported for duty.2"
Gibson was dismissed as a result of the incident. Two white
guards who had failed to make proper checks of the cell were given
13. Id. Sandhills Youth Center had been operating for five years at the time
of the incident. One hundred nineteen inmates had escaped over that period of
time. Only eight of these escapes had been from the segregation area. Apparently,
this escape was the only one to have occurred from within a segregation cell.
14. Id. at 134, 301 S.E.2d at 80-81.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 135, 301 S.E.2d at 81. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and
Order of State Personnel Commission at 11 (Aug. 29, 1980).
21. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 11 (Aug. 29, 1980).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 27.
1984]
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oral warnings with a follow-up letter.24 Gibson appealed his dismis-
sal to the State Personnel Commission, alleging he was dismissed
because of his race. The Department of Correction asserted that
Gibson had been discharged due to his negligence in failing to de-
tect the escape of Dunlap and Crumpler under circumstances
which should have alerted Gibson to investigate further to ensure
the presence of the inmates. To show that the Department's as-
serted reason was in fact a pretext for a discriminatory motive,
Gibson presented evidence that in a previous incident resulting in
an escape, a white guard had failed to make proper checks in the
nonsegregation area but had not been dismissed. 5 Gibson also
presented evidence that no employee had ever been discharged for
negligence in failing to detect an escape."6 The State Personnel
Commission held that Gibson had raised a permissible inference
that he had been dismissed due to his race and ordered Gibson's
reinstatement.27 The superior court reversed the Commission's or-
der, holding that the Commission had improperly applied the evi-
dentiary standards under Title VII which resulted in a decision
grounded upon unlawful procedure, affected by error of law, un-
supported by substantial evidence, and arbitrary and capricious.2 8
The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court and reinstated
the order of the Commission, holding that the Commission had
properly applied the evidentiary standards under Title VII and the
superior court had exceeded the proper scope of review under
N.C.G.S. § 150-51. 29
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the Depart-
ment of Correction argued that the Commission had analyzed the
issue of pretext from the standpoint of "... the strength and
24. 308 N.C. at 135, 301 S.E.2d at 81.
25. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 8-9 (Aug. 29, 1980); Dep't of Correction v. Gibson, 308 N.C. 131,
142, 301 S.E.2d 78, 85 (1983).
26. Superintendent Hubbard testified that employees had been fired for neg-
ligence which resulted in an escape. He elaborated on this statement by further
testifying that only two employees had been dismissed for negligent con-
duct-Gibson and another black employee, who had been sleeping on the job. The
other employee was later reinstated. Therefore, Gibson is the only employee who
has been fired for conduct resulting in an escape. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction,
Decision and Order of State Personnel Commission at 10-11 (Aug. 29, 1980).
27. Id. at 37.
28. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, No. 80 CVS 6262 (Wake County, Feb. 18,
1981).
29. Dep't of Correction v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 293 S.E.2d 664 (1982).
[Vol. 6:163
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merit of the employer's logic and thought processes rather than the
employer's motive." 30 The Supreme Court agreed that the Depart-
ment was entitled to make a bad business decision without being
charged with employment discrimination, and subsequently re-
versed and remanded to the State Personnel Commission. 1
BACKGROUND
Since as early as 1941 when President Roosevelt established
the Committee on Fair Employment Practices, 32 an effort has been
underway in this country to eliminate employment discrimination.
The Committee on Fair Employment Practices had no enforce-
ment powers arid, thus, proved to be largely ineffective.3" As a re-
sult, Congress ultimately enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which granted broad enforcement powers to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission to eliminate discrimination. 4 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to eliminate dis-
criminatory employment practices. Title VII was necessary largely
because of the failure of state and local governments to deal with
civil rights problems. 5 The philosophy behind Title VII has been
succinctly stated by the United States Supreme Court as "...[tol-
erating] no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise."' 6 The Su-
preme Court had also recognized that state anti-discrimination
laws play an integral role in the Congressional scheme to eliminate
discrimination.3 7
30. Petitioner Appellant's New Brief at 23, Dep't of Correction v. Gibson, 308
N.C. 131, 301 S.E.2d 78 (1983).
31. 308 N.C. at 148, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
32. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a
Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L. REV. 1171, 1178 (1965).
33. Id.
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 [hereinafter
cited as Title VII]. When Title VII was enacted, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission had to refer matters to the Attorney General for assistance. In
1972, the Commission was given the power to sue private employers. Pub. L. No.
92-261, § 8(d)-(f), 86 Stat. 109, 110 (1972) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6).
35. Witherspoon, supra note 32, at 1172.
36. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
37. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1982), cert. de-
nied 103 S. Ct. 20 (1982). One commentator suggests that the role of the states in
the area of civil rights will increase as the federal government becomes more
budget conscious, reducing the budget of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. Leap and Grigsby, State Fair Employment Practice Laws: Problems
and Prospects, 32 LAB. L.J. 808 (1981).
1984]
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The North Carolina legislature has been inactive in the area of
civil rights legislation in the area of employment. Employment dis-
crimination actions are typically pursued in the federal courts
under Title VII. However, two isolated statutes have been enacted
to deal with specific types of employment discrimination. N.C.G.S.
§ 168-6 prohibits employment discrimination against handicapped
persons, 8 and N.C.G.S. § 95-28.1 prohibits employment discrimi-
nation against persons who possess sickle cell trait or hemoglobin
C trait. 9 The reported decisions under these two statutes have ad-
dressed jurisdictional questions but not the substance of the dis-
criminatory action alleged and the manner of proof required.
In 1975, the North Carolina legislature enacted N.C.G.S. §
126-36 which gives State employees the right to challenge any em-
ployment decision which is based on ". . .age, sex, race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, creed, political affiliation, or physical disabil-
ity .... -40 The State Personnel Commission has the power to
investigate such complaints, hold hearings, and frame appropriate
relief. 4 1 The decisions of the State Personnel Commission are re-
viewable by the superior courts.4
Prior to Gibson, the North Carolina courts had not addressed
the issue of the proper evidentiary standards to apply in a discrim-
ination suit brought under N.C.G.S. § 126-36. However, the lan-
guage of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 43 closely parallels the
wording of the North Carolina statute. In addition, the goals of
Title VII and N.C.G.S. § 126-36 are the same: to eliminate discrim-
inatory practices.44 Given the similarity in wording and purpose,
the court in Gibson recognized the merits in applying the "tried
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-6 (1982).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (1981).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-36 (1981).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-4 (1981).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-50 (1983). The provisions of the North Carolina
Administrative Procedure Act are specifically applicable to the State Personnel
Commission. N.C.GEN. STAT. § 126-43 (1981). Statutory exceptions to this general
applicability are set forth in N.C.GEN. STAT. § 126-43 (1981), but are not relevant
to this note.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
44. 308 N.C. at 141, 301 S.E.2d at 85.
[Vol. 6:163
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and true" federal standards to North Carolina employment dis-
crimination cases. 5
Employment discrimination suits under Title VII have
evolved under two separate theories-disparate impact and dispa-
rate treatment. While the two are not mutually exclusive, in that
an employee may be able to choose between the two in any given
case, the burden of proof imposed on the employee under each the-
ory is different.46 Under a "disparate impact" theory, the employee
must show a discriminatory result but need not prove discrimina-
tory intent by his employer. 7 The employee must make out a
prima facie case of discrimination against his employer.4 The bur-
den of proof then shifts to the employer to show business necessity
for his actions.4 9 If the employee can show that an alternative prac-
tice would have been as effective, with less discriminatory impact,
he is likely to prevail in his suit.50 Conversely, under a "disparate
treatment" theory, the focus is on the employer's impermissible
motive. 51 The employee again must prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination by his employer.5 2 However, the burden of proof does
not shift to the employer. A burden of production shifts to the em-
ployer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
his actions.8 Once the employer articulates a reason, the burden of
45. Id. at 136, 301 S.E.2d at 82.
46. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). The court recognized
that Title VII cases could rightfully be asserted under different theories, but held
that the fact situation before the court was more appropriately resolved under the
disparate impact theory.
47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (the emphasis is
on employment policies that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation; Ti-
tle VII is directed to the consequences of the employment practices and not sim-
ply to motivation). See generally, Mendez, Presumptions of Discriminatory Mo-
tive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129 (1980).
48. The four elements of a prima facie showing of discrimination are: (1) the
employee belongs to a protected class; (2) the employee has applied and was qual-
ified for a job; (3) the employee was rejected for the job, despite his qualifications;
and (4) after the employee was rejected, the employer continued to seek applica-
tions from others who had the rejected employee's qualifications. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
49. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). See also Wright v
Olin Corp, 697 F.2d 1172, 1185 (4th Cir. 1982).
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See also Wright v.
Olin Corp, 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
51. Mendez, supra note 47, at 1129.
52. 411 U.S. at 802.
53. Id. The Court has used the terms "articulate" and "prove" interchangea-
19841
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proof and production merges on the employee to show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the reason proffered by the em-
ployer is merely a pretext.54 A disparate impact theory would be
utilized in a situation where an employer has facially neutral poli-
cies which adversely affect minorities. A disparate treatment the-
ory would be utilized in a situation where an employer has failed
to apply policies evenhandedly to members of all races. 55 The Gib-
son case is an example of the latter theory.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
appropriate evidentiary standards to apply in a disparate treat-
ment case in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.56 In McDonnell
Douglas the Court held that the employee has an initial burden of
production to show a prima facie case of discrimination.57 The bur-
den on the employee is relatively insignificant at this point. The
employee must show at a minimum that his treatment did not re-
sult from the two most common legitimate reasons for adverse
treatment-lack of proper qualifications for the position sought
and absence of a vacancy in the position sought. 58 Although the
original formulation of the elements of a prima facie case was in
the context of the hiring process,5' the Court has recognized that it
may be applicable in a differing factual situation. The formulation
has been adapted and applied to promotion" as well as discharge
bly in referring to the burden on the employer at this point. Although this seems
to be ambiguous, it is clear that the employer has no burden of persuasion. The
question is-what will be sufficient to overcome the burden of production? To
articulate, one need prove very little. See Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof
in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VANm. L.
REv. 1205, 1272 (1981) for the suggestion that the burden is by a mere scintilla. If
so, the author suggests that an employee may not prevail even if the employer's
evidence is not credible.
54. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257-58
(1981).
55. 411 U.S. at 806. Differences in treatment could be shown by evidence
that the employer's attitude was generally unfavorable to civil rights activities,
minorities, or the individual during his term of employment. In Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Court stressed that the
employer needed to clearly set forth the reasons for the employee's rejection.
56. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. Id. at 802. See supra note 48 for the four elements of a prima facie show-
ing of discrimination.
58. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44
(1977).
59. 411 U.S. at 796.
60. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
170 [Vol. 6:163
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situations. 1
After the employee makes a prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his actions.2
The Court grappled with this aspect of the McDonnell Douglas
formulation in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine. s In Burdine, the Court stated that the purpose of requiring
the employer to articulate a reason is " . . . to frame the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the [employee] will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. The sufficiency of the
[employer's] evidence should be evaluated by the extent to which
it fulfills [this] function."6 ' The proper function of the employer's
rebuttal burden is to put the employee on notice of the direction
that his proof of pretext needs to take.s
The final stage of the McDonnell Douglas formulation is proof
by the employee that the employer's reason is pretextual." This is
the crucial issue in a disparate treatment case. The Court has ad-
dressed the issue of proving pretext on several occasions, but only
in a peripheral way.6 7 In McDonnell Douglas, the Court listed sev-
eral situations which might support an inference of discrimination.
For example, showing that nonminorities involved in acts of com-
parable seriousness were retained or rehired; showing that the em-
ployer's treatment of minorities in general has been historically
unfavorable; or showing that the employer has reacted unfavorably
to civil rights activities would support an inference that a pretext
existed.5s In McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 69
the Court stated in a footnote that the employee need not show
61. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
•62. 411 U.S. at 805.
63. 450 U.S. at 255. The Court elaborated on the extent of the employer's
articulation. The employer must clearly set forth the reasons for the rejection of
the employee sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact.
64. Id. at 255-56. The Court reiterated its statement from Board of Trustees
of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978), that the employer need
not persuade the trier of fact of an absence of discriminatory intent.
65. Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9 (1979).
66. 411 U.S. at 805.
67. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219 (1982); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
68. 411 U.S. at 804-05.
69. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
1984]
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that race was the employer's sole motivation but need only show
that "but for" the discriminatory motive the adverse action would
not have resulted.7 0 The Court has also held that statistical data
has probative value in showing pretext.71
The biggest problem in proving pretext arises in a situation
where the employer has a mixed motive for his actions. Because of
the nature of discrimination and the difficulty of proof, if the em-
ployer has a mixed motive, the burden on the employee will often
be insurmountable. An employee will seldom be able to rely on di-
rect evidence of discrimination.7 2 The decision by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Gibson adopted the standards as set forth
in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, and left the issue of pre-
text unexamined.
ANALYSIS
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Department of Correc-
tion v. Gibson, recognized that the "ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the [employer] intentionally discriminated
against the employee remains at all times with the [employee].""7
In reversing and remanding, the court held that the Commission
had required the Department to justify the retention of an em-
ployee when just cause to discharge the employee existed. By re-
quiring a compelling justification for the different treatment af-
forded to a white employee who was not discharged when just
cause existed, the court felt that the Commission had imposed a
burden of persuasion on the Department.74 In conjunction with the
improper imposition of the burden of persuasion on the Depart-
ment, the court also held that the Commission had improperly
substituted its judgment for the Department's.75 In the court's
view the combination of these factors resulted in an Order by the
Commission that was marred by unlawful procedure and affected
70. Id. at 282 n. 10.
71. In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978), the Court
warned against relying too heavily on statistics. In a disparate treatment case the
issue is the treatment of an individual, not general employment practices. Statis-
tics have probative value, but are not conclusive. See also International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977).
72. Friedman, supra note 65, at 24.
73. 308 N.C. at 138, 301 S.E.2d at 83.
74. Id. at 146-47, 301 S.E.2d at 87-88.
75. Id. at 146-48, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
[Vol. 6:163
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by error of law.7
Since Gibson was a case of first impression in North Carolina,
the court looked to federal decisions for guidance in establishing
evidentiary standards to be applied in employment discrimination
suits under N.C.G.S. § 126-36. 7 The court then adopted the evi-
dentiary standards under Title VII7 s By adopting these standards,
the court provided the Commission with a framework within which
to analyze the evidence presented by the parties in an employment
discrimination suit. However, a careful reading of the conclusions
contained in the Commission Order makes it readily apparent that
the Commission had implicitly utilized the McDonnell Douglas ev-
identiary standards:
2. . . Mr. Gibson has presented a prima facie [sic] of race
discrimination...
3. It is not incumbent upon [the Department] to present legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision...
4. It is now incumbent upon [Gibson] to show that the reasons
elicited by [the Department] for imposing a harsher disciplinary
punishment upon him were a pretext...71
The court agreed with the Commission's application of the eviden-
tiary standards, but only as applied to the proof of a prima facie
case by Gibson (Conclusion 2), and the adequacy of the rebuttal of
the prima facie case by the Department of Correction (Conclusion
3).8 0 The court disagreed with the Commission's conclusion that
Gibson had shown pretextual reasons for the Department's ac-
tions,s1 because the Commission stated that the Department must
show some compelling justification for the retention of one em-
ployee and the termination of another employee under substan-
tially similar circumstances. 8 The court interpreted this language
as requiring the Department to prove an absence of discriminatory
motive. Under Burdine, any burden of persuasion (proof) on the
Department clearly is too stringent.83 The Department has a bur-
76. Id. at 147, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 34-36 (Aug. 29, 1980).
80. 308 N.C. at 142, 301 S.E.2d at 85.
81. Id. at 147, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
82. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 36 (Aug. 29, 1980).
83. "The [employer] need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
1984]
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den of production not a burden of persuasion. The North Carolina
Supreme Court's disagreement with the Commission's order was
conclusory, and the case was remanded without any guidance for
the resolution of the real issue-the proper method and type of
proof of discriminatory intent that is necessary once the factual
issue of pretext has been framed by the prima facie case of the
employee and the rebuttal of the employer. The guidance given by
the Court was to criticize the wording of the order, instead of its
substance." In reaching its conclusion, the Court admitted to only
a cursory 85 examination of the conclusion by the Commission re-
garding the credibility of the Department's business judgment.ss
Unquestionably, the employee should have the burden of per-
suasion. In civil actions, the proponent's burden of persuasion is by
the preponderance of the evidence.8 7 Proof by a preponderance of
the evidence relates to the credibility of the evidence offered and
not to its quantity."8 In an employment discrimination suit the em-
ployee must persuade the court that the reason articulated by the
employer in rebutting the prima facie case is in reality a pretext
for a discriminatory motive. The response by the Department to
the assertion that they had a pretextual motive in discharging Gib-
son was misinterpreted by the Court. To show pretext, Gibson per-
suaded the Commission that the reasons proferred by the Depart-
ment in meeting its rebuttal burden were not credible and thus not
legitimate reasons.8' The Department failed to offer any credible
alternative to Gibson's assertions.'0 The Commission, after hearing
the evidence, was persuaded that the evidence presented by Gib-
vated by the proferred reasons." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (reiterating Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978)).
84. 308 N.C. at 147, 301 S.E.2d at 88. The implicit meaning of the Commis-
sion's findings was that the Department did not believe the situation involving
the white employee who negligently allowed an escape to be distinguishable. The
Commission did not directly state this proposition in their findings and the court
felt that they should have.
85. Cursory means to go rapidly over something without noticing details; su-
perficial; hasty. Random House, Inc., The Random House Dictionary of the En-
glish Language, the Unabridged Edition (Stein 1967).
86. 308 N.C. at 147, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
87. 6 N.C. INDEx 3D, Evidence § 6 (Strong's 1977).
88. Id.
89. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 36 (Aug. 29, 1980).
90. Id.
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son as to pretext was of greater weight than that offered in opposi-
tion to it by the Department.91 But the decision by the North Car-
olina Supreme Court denied the Commission the right to consider
the weight of the evidence.92
No language in the opinion in Gibson indicates the weight of
the burden of production by the Department. The implication by
the United States Supreme Court is that the burden will be satis-
fied by a mere scintilla of evidence, or, in other words, just enough
to frame the factual issue of pretext.9 The reason for this minimal
burden stems from the purpose of the rebuttal by the em-
ployer-merely to sharpen the issue so the employee knows the di-
rection which his proof of pretextual motivation must take.9' The
flaw in the Gibson case is the failure of the court to strike a proper
balance between the employee's burden of persuasion and the em-
ployer's burden of production-the scales are heavily weighted in
favor of the employer. If, as the court stated, the employer need
only articulate a reason, then, the employer need only proffer any
reason, whether it is credible or not. As a practical matter, the rea-
sons given by a business entity will frequently be based on legiti-
mate business judgment, which tends to be subjective. The most
obvious, and possibly the only, tactic for the employee to use is to
attack the credibility of the articulated business reason. The Court
in Gibson established a rule that allows the business judgment of
the employer to stand as irrebuttable proof that no discriminatory
motive existed. This rule in effect requires the employee to pro-
91. Superintendent Hubbard, who was responsible for dismissing Gibson, was
asked whether he would admit that race played a part in his decision. He re-
sponded, "[i]t depends on how big a man I am." Id. at 29. Superintendent Hub-
bard, in an attempt to clarify this response, was asked on redirect examination,
"[h]ow big a man are you? Would you admit that?" He responded "[y]es, I would.
No, I wouldn't. . ." Id. at 30. Superintendent Hubbard was also vague in answer-
ing questions about whether the employees understood the policy about checking
inmates. Id.at 15.
92. It is well established that the reviewing court cannot weigh the evidence
and substitute its judgment for that of an agency. See In re Amp, Inc., 287 N.C.
547, 215 S.E.2d 752 (1975) (State Board of Assessments); Comm'r of Ins. v. Rate
Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 S.E.2d 547, reh'g denied 301 N.C. 107, 273 S.E.2d 300
(1980) (Commissioner of Insurance); Overton v. Bd. of Educ., 304 N.C. 312, 283
S.E.2d 495 (1981) (Board of Education); N.C. A & T University v. Kimber, 49
N.C. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 492 (1980) (State Personnel Commission).
93. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56
(1981).
94. Id. See generally, Friedman, supra note 65.
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duce direct evidence of discrimination in order to prevail on the
pretext issue. The fallacy in this reasoning is that it fails to recog-
nize that direct evidence in a modern day employment discrimina-
tion case seldom, if ever, can be produced. 9 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court in Gibson said "[t]he sole question for the trier of
fact in the context of this case is whether defendant DOC [Depart-
ment of Correction] was racially motivated in its discharge of
plaintiff."96 This begs the question and does not clarify how the
trier of fact is to reach its decision when no direct evidence exists.
Gibson chose to challenge the credibility of the Department's deci-
sion. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the Commis-
sion had rejected the Department of Corrections proferred reasons
on credibility grounds,7 but the North Carolina Supreme Court
did not.
The crux of the matter is the proper use of indirect evidence
to show that the employer's reason lacks credence. The United
States Supreme Court in Burdine recognized the inherent problem
of proof in a discrimination case when it stated ". . . [the em-
ployee] may succeed . . . by either directly persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."98 An analysis of an alleged discrimination
charge is based on the premise that the public policy is to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices in employment. This means to elimi-
nate all forms of discrimination, whether in a subtle form or in an
overt form. In Gibson, the Court stated that the policy behind
N.C.G.S. § 126-36 was to eliminate discriminatory practices in em-
ployment.99 The only way to completely eliminate discrimination is
to scrutinize an allegation of discrimination. Three factors should
be weighed by the court in establishing guidelines by which to ana-
lyze a discrimination suit where no direct evidence is available.
95. Belton, supra note 53, at 1224. Overt discriminatory practices are seldom
encountered. Thus, at best, the employee may be able to prove an inference [of
discrimination] . . . warranted by human reason and experience that a factfinder
may make from established facts." See Friedman, supra note 65, at 24, for com-
ments on the inherent difficulty of proving what goes on in a person's mind.
96. 308 N.C. at 147, 301 S.E.2d at 88.
97. Dep't of Correction v. Gibson, 58 N.C. App. 241, 247, 293 S.E.2d 664, 671
(1982). "[The] State Personnel Commission exercised its inherent function to de-
termine credibility and weight of the evidence. .. " Id.
98. 450 U.S. at 256.
99. 308 N.C. at 141, 301 S.E.2d at 85.
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First, the relative unavailability of direct evidence should be
determined. In this day and age, direct evidence will seldom be
found. Direct evidence can be diluted by other factors. The work
place is a complex environment, and it is often difficult for the em-
ployee to uncover direct evidence of discrimination. Thus, the un-
availability of direct evidence is essentially a presupposed fact for
purposes of this analysis. If direct evidence of discriminatory in-
tent is available, the court would then decide any disputed ques-
tions of fact as in any civil litigation-based on the weight and
credibility of the evidence.
Second, decisions by an employer are often based on subjec-
tive criteria. The employer should be required to produce objective
reasons for the treatment of an employee. The employer must pro-
vide more than a self-serving assertion of a vague, amorphous busi-
ness reason. Most people are aware that one of the primary func-
tions of the Department of Correction is to prevent inmates from
escaping into the community. By the same token, it is presumed
that this will be accomplished by training employees to follow cer-
tain procedures in order to detect escapes. The Department should
have specific criteria for disciplining its employees and should ap-
ply these criteria evenhandedly. One stated reason for discharging
an employee that is found in the Department employee handbook
is "[n]egligence that seriously jeopardizes the safety of fellow em-
ployees or inmates."100 Superintendent Hubbard did not specify
exactly what "seriously jeopardize" entailed. The fact that the es-
cape occurred before Gibson ever came on duty would tend to indi-
cate that his actions did not seriously jeopardize any fellow em-
ployees or inmates. In addition, the Department produced
evidence that its employees were required to attend a training ses-
sion, but the evidence was equivocal as to whether the employees
understood what was required of them,10' and whether these crite-
ria were enforced.
Third, if the employer has established objective criteria, the
next logical step is to apply these criteria evenhandedly. The em-
ployee should be able to produce comparative evidence to show
that a minority was not treated the same way a nonminority was
treated. The employer should be on notice that any time an excep-
tion is made to the rules, the employee personnel file should prop-
100. Division of Prisons Regulation 5 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2F 1300 (1976).
101. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 15 (Aug. 29, 1980).
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erly reflect the reason. The reason should not be vaguely
remembered two years later when a minority employee is suddenly
subjected to harsher treatment. Superintendent Hubbard had no
documentation to support the lenient treatment of a white em-
ployee, other than his memory, the memory of another employee,
and the general nature of the facilities at Sandhills Youth Center.
These factors have the disadvantage of being peculiarly susceptible
to subconscious discrimination. McDonnell Douglas noted that a
racially motivated decision could be shown by proof that a white
employee was involved in acts of "comparable seriousness" and
was treated more favorably.'0 2 "Comparable seriousness" was re-
ferred to again in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co.'03 where the court stated that "precise equivalence in culpabil-
ity between employees is not the ultimate question [but rather]
comparable seriousness. . .revised is adequate to plead an inferen-
tial case that. . .grounds for [termination were] merely a pre-
text."' ' Although the culpability of Gibson and the white guard
was not precisely equivalent, both failed to make proper "flesh"
checks. Both incidents involved an escape. The Commission
viewed the two incidents as comparably serious'0 5 and felt that the
reasons given by Superintendent Hubbard for discharging Gibson
when the white guard was not discharged were not credible in light
of the similarity in the surrounding circumstances.
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, discussions
during the House hearings indicated that ". . . .management pre-
rogatives. . .are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possi-
ble. Internal affairs of employers. . .must not be interfered with
except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimi-
nation."' 0 6 No bright line can be drawn as to when an employer's
managerial judgment has been interfered with unnecessarily; how-
ever, if an employer establishes objective procedures, applies the
procedures evenhandedly to all employees, and properly docu-
ments employee files, many problems of proof in a discrimination
case will be eliminated. The managerial judgment of the employer
will be left intact, yet the employee will have the opportunity to
prove his case if the employer has failed to document its actions.
102. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973).
103. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
104. Id. at 284 n. 11.
105. Gibson v. Dep't of Correction, Decision and Order of State Personnel
Commission at 36 (Aug. 29, 1980).
106. H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963).
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Employers will be on notice as to what tools an employee can use
against them and can anticipate the available defenses. Frivolous
suits by employees will be discouraged if they know the employer
is adhering to stated policies.
In order to ensure that North Carolina continues to have a
viable cause of action for employment discrimination, a framework
-must be established within which such actions may be pursued.
The employee must be allowed to refute the evidence presented by
the employer in rebutting the prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion. The evidence must be submitted to the trier of facts, in this
case the Commission, to evaluate the credibility of the evidence.
Judge Hedrick stated in a dissenting opinion in Overton v. Board
of Education,107 that it is not the function of the court to substi-
tute its judgment for that of an administrative agency when rea-
sonably conflicting views are presented. 108 Further, the North Car-
olina Supreme Court has stated, in reviewing an order of the State
Personnel Commission, that the reviewing court was not at liberty
to replace the Commission's judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views.109 The concept of a prima facie case and the re-
buttal as formulated in Burdine presupposes that conflicting views
will be presented. The employee must be allowed to show that the
reasons proferred by the employer are not justified by the sur-
rounding facts. The main thrust of the decisions by those courts
that have grappled with the issue of pretext has been the persua-
siveness of the reasons proferred by the employer and the em-
ployee.110 When the employee is able to show that the rebuttal by
107. Overton v. Bd. of Educ., 51 N.C. App. 303, 276 S.E.2d 458 (1981) (Hed-
rick, J., dissenting), aff'd, 304 N.C. 312, 283 S.E.2d 495 (1981).
108. 51 N.C. App. at 309, 276 S.E.2d at 462 (Hedrick, J., dissenting).
109. Thompson v. Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541
(1977).
110. The courts must determine whether a presumptively valid reason for an
employer's action is, in fact, a cover-up for a discriminatory reason. See, e.g., Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (employer's justifications were unworthy
of credence); Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 697 F.2d 928
(11th Cir. 1983) (employee proved that the employer's rebuttal lacked credence);
McCormick v. District of Columbia, 554 F.Supp. 640 (D.C. 1982) (excellent job
evaluation two weeks before dismissal made testimony of poor job performance
less than credible). But see Brady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Employer offered specific and persuasive reasons for treating two employees dif-
ferently. The employee failed to offer any conflicting evidence.); EEOC v. Univ. of
Okla., 554 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (employer's reasons were essentially
unrefuted by the employee). Martin v. Chrysler Corp., 10 FEP 329 (E.D. Mich.
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the employer lacks credence, the employee will prevail. The United
States Supreme Court, in reviewing an employment discrimination
case, has stated its concurrence with findings as to the credence of
the employer's justifications."' The employee may introduce infer-
ential evidence that the employer's reasons were not true. 1 2 The
employer must make more than a vague assertion of a business
reason for its decision. " The employer must be required to show
that its decision was based on conscientious, objective, analytical
business judgment.1" In the absence of such a showing, the em-
ployee should prevail. The employee must be given a full and fair
opportunity to rebut the employer's asserted reasons. The court
need not evaluate the employer's reasons in view of what decision
it would have reached on its own volition. The decision may not
necessarily be the best decision possible under the circumstances.
But, the court must evaluate the evidence to ensure that the rea-
son is indeed credible given the totality of the surrounding circum-
stances. If the employer has established a decision-making frame-
work, the employee may be assured that no improper motive
entered into the decision, even if the decision was adverse to the
1974) (reasons proferred by employee were equivocal and less than candid; person-
ality conflicts were well-documented by the employer.)
111. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, -, 102 S. Ct. 3057, 3062 n.7
(1982).
112. In deciding the probative value of circumstantial evidence, the court
must determine the reliability and the relative availability of direct evidence. Di-
rect evidence is difficult to obtain; thus, if a court refuses to give any probative
value to circumstantial evidence, the employee will never prevail. In EEOC v.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th cir. 1983), the court em-
braced a philosophy of using a "pinch of common sense" in evaluating the credi-
bility of evidence offered.
113. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 553 F. Supp. 601 (D. Conn.
1982) (Assertions by the employer as to assignments based on physical abilities
were contradicted by fact that disabled white employee was given a "good assign-
ment" even though not physically qualified. In addition, established disciplinary
policies were leniently applied to whites, but strictly applied to blacks. Whites
often were reprimanded or suspended for a short period, while black employees
were discharged).
114. An employer should be prepared to present credible evidence to show
that all its employees are treated alike. Olsen v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 480
F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd. sub. noma. Willey v. Southern Pacific Transp.
Co., 654 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1981). Where the action challenged by the employer is
based on subjective qualifications, and the decision-maker is white, the court
should evaluate the evidence closely. Grano v. Dep't of Dev., 699 F.2d 836 (6th
Cir. 1983).
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employee's interest.
CONCLUSION
The Gibson court established evidentiary standards to apply
in an employment discrimination case under N.C.G.S. § 126-36. At
the outset, the employee must make a prima facie showing of dis-
crimination. Then the employer has a burden of production to re-
but the employee's prima facie case by articulating a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for his actions. Finally, the burden of
production and persuasion merges in the employee to show that
the reason proferred by the employer is a mere pretext for a dis-
criminatory motive. The court established a procedural framework
to be utilized in employment discrimination cases. However, the
Gibson decision provides little guidance as to how an employee can
properly show that an employer's articulated reason is a pretext
for a discriminatory motive.
The issue of pretext is the crux of an employment discrimina-
tion suit when an employee alleges disparate treatment. In Gibson,
the only guidance provided was the statement that the State Per-
sonnel Commission improperly infringed on the business judgment
of the Department of Correction in reaching its decision that the
Department had discriminated against Gibson. The primary ave-
nue of proof that should be available to the employee was elimi-
nated. Courts should be reluctant to intrude on the legitimate bus-
iness judgment of an employer. At the same time, the interest of
employees should also be recognized. Public policy demands that
the employee be given an effective opportunity to challenge dis-
criminatory employment decisions. The court cannot allow an em-
ployer's purported business judgment to stand as a barrier to a le-
gitimate claim of discrimination.
The proof of pretext is difficult because of the existence of
subtle forms of discrimination. The issue of pretext requires care-
ful scrutiny of the relative unavailability of direct evidence, the ob-
jective reasons for treatment afforded to employees, and the even-
handedness of the employer in applying policies to all employees.
The North Carolina Supreme Court needs to grapple with the is-
sue of pretext and establish guidelines to ensure that N.C.G.S. §
126-36 is a viable tool in furthering the stated public policy found
in N.C.G.S. § 143-422.2-to protect the right of all persons to hold
employment without discrimination.
Beth Marshall
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